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South–South development cooperation is premised not only
on a commitment to solidarity and an interest in ‘‘mutual ben-
eﬁt” but also on a claim of similarity. When deployed by
Northern or multilateral development agencies interested in
supporting South–South exchange via Trilateral Development
Cooperation (TDC), the similarity claim is ‘‘frequently con-
structed in depoliticized and essentialist terms, presenting a
‘natural’ congruity between very diﬀerent southern states”
(McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012, p. 1887). When deployed by
‘‘rising powers” such as Brazil, China, or India, it tends to
be more overtly political, often invoking a common geopolit-
ical position or shared historical (colonial) experience (Six,
2009). Rising powers also deploy similarity claims that empha-
size the technical rather than the political, as is the case with
India’s eﬀort to promote its technologies as suitable for Africa
because they are ‘‘aﬀordable, adaptable and appropriate”
(Nayyar, 2012, p. 561). Such claims have underpinned the
rapid expansion in recent years of rising powers’ eﬀorts to
export their agricultural technologies and rural development
strategies to Africa—eﬀorts in which Brazil has been particu-
larly prominent (Scoones et al., 2016). In legitimating its devel-
opment cooperation strategies, Brazil has made eﬀective use of
both ‘‘political” and ‘‘technical” similarity claims. As Abdenur
(2015, p. 13) puts it, the country has diﬀerentiated its develop-
ment cooperation from Northern aid by emphasizing ‘‘solidar-
ity with African partners, especially by highlighting Brazil’s
past status as a former colony and its shared historical and
cultural bonds with Africa” as well as ‘‘compatibility, by
claiming that its own development experiences are more simi-
lar to those of African countries”.
These similarity claims have gained particular potency in the
agricultural development cooperation ﬁeld. Domestic and
international actors alike have come to assume that Brazil’s35remarkable growth in agricultural output and record of inno-
vation in tropical agriculture make it a natural source of
know-how for Africa (Cabral et al., 2016). However, similar
claims have been made for other rising powers, including
China (Xu et al., 2016) and India (Chaturvedi & Kumar,
2015). What sets Brazil apart is the way in which claims that
the country’s agricultural development models are particularly
suitable for export to Africa have been supported not only by
narratives focusing on innovation and production growth, but
also by powerful representations of the Brazilian landscape
that has both shaped and been shaped by these models. These
representations focus on the Cerrado savannah zone of Cen-
tral Brazil, and are deployed in ways that both emphasize
the Cerrado’s biophysical similarities with African savannah
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ing farmers from a sparsely-populated bush zone into one of
the world’s most important regions of export-oriented agricul-
tural production (Cabral, Shankland, Favareto, & Costa Vaz,
2013).
There is now a burgeoning literature that interrogates the
optimistic assumptions about transferability that have marked
the resurgence of interest in South–South cooperation, with
Wolford and Nehring (2015, p. 214), for example, arguing that
‘the term ‘‘South–South” highlights the dangers of the Carte-
sian logic that ascribes similar characteristics to groups of
countries that fall within the same latitudinal coordinates
and fails to do justice to considerable political, economic
and social diﬀerences’. Several scholars have also highlighted
the increasing contestation within the South of the use of such
claims to legitimate ‘‘sub-imperialism” (Bond & Garcia, 2015).
In this article, however, we focus on a hitherto neglected
aspect: the particular productive power that landscape-based
similarity claims can give both to the promotion and to the
contestation of South–South agricultural development cooper-
ation.
We explore this productive power in relation to Brazil’s lar-
gest agricultural development cooperation project in Africa,
the Program for Agricultural Development of the Tropical
Savannah in Mozambique—ProSAVANA. This is a TDC
program that involves Mozambique, Brazil, and Japan and
is coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Secu-
rity of Mozambique (MASA, formerly known as MINAG),
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the
Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). It was initially designed
with a view to replicating in Africa the experience of the
Brazil–Japan Cooperation Program for the Development of
the Brazilian Cerrado (PRODECER), described by JICA as
having produced a model of sustainable and inclusive
development (Hosono & Hongo, 2012). In addition to techni-
cal cooperation in agricultural research and extension using
experience and know-how from Brazil, ProSAVANA’s design
included a ‘‘Master Plan” component intended to guide
signiﬁcant private-sector investment in commercial agriculture
and agro-processing in its target region, the Nacala Corridor
in Northern Mozambique.
ProSAVANA has been widely contested by a coalition of
Mozambican and international NGOs, highlighting fears that
its agribusiness component will lead to land-grabbing
(Clements & Fernandes, 2012; Mello, 2013). It has now
become the principal focal point of mobilization against
land-grabbing in Mozambique, despite the evidence that an
inﬂux of Brazilian soy-farmers has not materialized (Wise,
2014). In fact, ProSAVANA has yet to establish a visible pres-
ence in Northern Mozambique, beyond an agricultural
research component (mainly focused on soybeans) whose
results have reached very few farmers, while the boom in
ProSAVANA-supported commercial agriculture envisaged
by a leaked version of the ‘‘Master Plan” has been limited to
half-a-dozen small-scale ‘‘quick impact projects” ﬁnanced by
a speciﬁc JICA fund with only tenuous Brazilian involvement
(Mosca & Bruna, 2015). After signiﬁcant delays in implemen-
tation, ProSAVANA, having been ﬁrst hailed as a transforma-
tive initiative and then viliﬁed as ‘‘the biggest land-grab in
Africa” (Justic¸a Ambiental, 2013; Mello, 2013; Nogueira &
Ollinaho, 2013; Wise, 2014), is now beginning to be seen, even
among its erstwhile backers, as a failed project or a broken
Brazilian promise. Nevertheless, ProSAVANA has remained
both an intense focus of civil society contestation and a pow-
erful brand for attracting private-sector interest to the Nacala
Corridor region.In this article, we explore the particular ways in which
both ProSAVANA’s promotion and its contestation have
mobilized material and symbolic resources, and the particular
eﬀects that this process has had not only on the program
itself but also on pro-peasant networks in Mozambique, Bra-
zil, and beyond. With a history that dates back to the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Borras, Edelman,
& Kay, 2008), and having grown in activity and visibility fol-
lowing structural adjustment and the neoliberal turn of the
1980s (Moyo, 2005), national and transnational pro-peasant
networks are now reconﬁguring themselves to engage with
South–South cooperation in a context marked by the expan-
sion of global capital and by authoritarian national regimes
in much of Africa. We argue that ProSAVANA has acceler-
ated this reconﬁguration by providing a particularly potent
rallying-point, and that this potency derives from the fact
that alongside particular—and divergent—imaginaries of
farming systems and desired scales of production, the mobi-
lization of particular landscape-related imaginaries has
played an important role in shaping not only the promotion
of the program but also its contestation. This is key to
understanding why, despite the program’s apparently limited
impact on the ground, ProSAVANA has become the focus of
such a powerful contestation process, and why this process
has had such signiﬁcant eﬀects. It has been powerfully pro-
ductive of changes not only in the program itself (whose oﬃ-
cial narrative has now undergone a major
reconceptualization), but also in the political and social rela-
tions shaping agricultural and development cooperation pol-
icy in Mozambique and Brazil. This, in turn, has wider
implications for the future of South–South cooperation.2. CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL
APPROACH
This study builds on a tradition of research on imaginaries
that stem from the work of Taylor (2002, p. 106), who uses
the term ‘‘social imaginary” to account for ‘‘the way ordinary
people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings [which] is often not
expressed in theoretical terms; it is carried in images, stories,
and legends”. As Gaonkar (2002, p. 4) puts it, imaginaries ‘‘ex-
ist by virtue of representation or implicit understandings even
when they acquire immense institutional force; and they are
the means by which individuals understand their identities
and their place in the world”. They also frame the ways in
which individuals and groups imagine each other’s roles in
development encounters, in a process that Hilhorst, Weijers,
and van Wessel (2012) have termed ‘‘mutual imaging”.
We extend this conceptualization to consider the mobilizing
power of other imaginaries, particularly those connected with
landscape. As Greider and Garkovich (1994, p. 1) put it, land-
scapes carry ‘‘multiple symbolic meanings that emanate from
the values by which people deﬁne themselves”. Following
Thompson (2012, p. 1), we term these representations ‘‘land-
scape imaginaries”, as they lie at the intersection of
historically-constructed perceptions of particular landscapes
and ‘‘modern social imaginaries”. Echoing the work of histo-
rians such as Schama (1995) who explore how diﬀerent soci-
eties’ cultural, institutional, and political trajectories are
shaped by the power of ideas about landscape, Thompson
(2012, p. 1) argues that ‘‘imaginaries we have inherited from
the past [. . .] continue to shape our landscapes and constrain
our environmental choices today”. In development studies, a
substantial body of research has examined how persistent
colonial imaginaries have shaped an ongoing process of
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Leach, 1996; Wolmer, 2007).
We are also interested in how ‘‘imaginaries” travel, and are
connected to transnational networks of social movements and
to networks of transnational capital (Appadurai, 1996;
Ferguson & Gupta, 2002), in particular in the contestation
of agrarian change and the state-promoted rush for land
(Wolford, Borras, Hall, Scoones, & White, 2013). These
understandings of social imaginaries and their relationship
to landscapes and social movements provide a useful entry
point for understanding how, in everyday life, South–South
cooperation is co-constructed by actors who hold very diﬀer-
ent views of both landscapes and development processes.
Our research focused on the contestation of ProSAVANA
during 2012–15, when the ‘‘Master Plan” was being developed.
We combined document review and collection of audio-visual
materials with a process of multi-sited ethnography (Marcus,
1995). We constructed an archive and timeline of the pro-
gram’s development and the contestation process, using gov-
ernment documents, audio-visual materials, civil society
statements, and newspaper reports, supplemented by multiple
key informant interviews in Mozambique and Brazil.
Following our initial ﬁeldwork in Brası´lia, Sa˜o Paulo, and
Maputo (see Cabral et al., 2013; Chichava et al., 2013), we
undertook ﬁeld visits to six sites in the Nacala Corridor 1 in
August and September 2013, during which we interviewed
dozens of members of regional and local peasant organiza-
tions, residents of villages where Brazilian investments had
been reported and provincial and district government repre-
sentatives, as well as observing a major regional mobilization
meeting organized in Lichinga (Niassa Province) by
Mozambique’s National Union of Peasants (UNAC) and a
visit by UNAC mobilizers to Majune District (Niassa). During
late 2013–14, we attended several public events in Maputo
convened by UNAC (including the ‘‘Triangular People’s
Conference” organized with Brazilian and Japanese civil society
organizations in July 2014), as well as other international
events in Brazil (particularly those organized around the
BRICS Academic Forum in March 2014) where civil society
actors debated their response to ProSAVANA. Finally, we
carried out two brief periods of follow-up ﬁeldwork in
Maputo and Nampula in June and August 2015 to observe
civil society responses to the consultation process on the ‘‘Zero
Draft” Master Plan. Throughout this process we have
remained in direct contact with key ﬁgures in Mozambican
and Brazilian civil society, as well as accompanying online
debates on ProSAVANA. This approach has enabled us to
examine not only the representations of agricultural develop-
ment, the savannah, and the Cerrado deployed in key texts
and audio-visual materials, but also the settings in which these
were discussed and negotiated.3. AN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
CALLED PROSAVANA
In April 2015 the Government of Mozambique released a
‘‘Zero Draft” of the ProSAVANA Master Plan in Portuguese
and launched a consultation process on its content. 2 This
came 5 years after ProSAVANA was announced and 3 years
after the start of a civil society campaign that had sought ﬁrst
to obtain more information about the program, then to secure
a pause for broader consultation on it, then to halt it alto-
gether. It also came fully 2 years after a partial draft of the
Master Plan was leaked, containing proposals for large-scale
commercial agriculture development that apparently con-ﬁrmed the fears of the program’s detractors (Justic¸a
Ambiental, 2013; Nogueira & Ollinaho, 2013; Okada, 2015).
However, the ﬁnally released ‘‘Zero Draft” was very diﬀerent,
undergoing ‘‘many metamorphoses” (Mosca & Bruna, 2015,
p. 2): it was largely silent on the prospects for private invest-
ment in large-scale commercial agriculture, focusing instead
on government support for small farmers as a means to ‘‘im-
prove the livelihood of inhabitants of the Nacala Corridor
through inclusive and sustainable agricultural and regional
development.” 3
The program’s initial documentation (ABC & Embrapa,
2011; Oriental Consultants, 2010) strongly emphasized the
role of private investment, reﬂecting the fact that by the time
ProSAVANA emerged, Mozambique had long since aban-
doned the post-independence vision that agricultural develop-
ment would come from peasants’ labor on state or collective
farms (Arau´jo, 1988; Castel-Branco, 1994). Private—and espe-
cially foreign—investment had come to play a growing role in
oﬃcial imaginaries of rural development, particularly after the
failure of the heavily donor-funded National Program of
Agrarian Development (PROAGRI), which was criticized
for focusing excessively on institutional development of state
agencies and paying insuﬃcient attention to smallholder agri-
culture, particularly commercialization, credit, and rural
infrastructure (Cabral, Shrivastava, & Muendane, 2007;
Cunguara & Garrett, 2011). By the time the leaked version
of the ProSAVANA Master Plan appeared in 2013, a new
Strategic Plan for Agrarian Sector Development (Plano Estra-
te´gico de Desenvolvimento do Sector Agra´rio, PEDSA) was in
place that identiﬁed six high-priority ‘‘Development Corri-
dors”, of which the Nacala Corridor was one. Although
PEDSA took a broadly pro-smallholder approach to strength-
ening agriculture within these corridors, its operationalisation
relied on the agribusiness-friendly National Agriculture and
Food Security Investment Plan (PNISA). This was criticized
by the peasant union UNAC, which called for PNISA to be
complemented by a ‘‘National Plan for Supporting Family
Farming”. 4
PNISA reﬂected the way in which capital-intensive agribusi-
ness has come to be imagined by the Mozambican policy elite
as a powerful alternative agricultural development approach.
This perspective grew in importance after President Armando
Emı´lio Guebuza came to power in 2005 promising a ‘‘green
revolution”, although this term itself faded out of oﬃcial
rhetoric without yielding visible results. 5 The food, fuel, and
ﬁnancial crises of the late 2000s increased the pressure on
the Mozambican government to do something about hunger
at the same time as they intensiﬁed the interest of international
capital in acquiring land in Mozambique. As South African,
European, Malaysian, Indian, Brazilian, and Chinese inves-
tors have sought to capitalize on the agricultural potential of
Mozambican ‘‘Development Corridors”, there have been a
growing number of cases where peasants have complained of
being displaced from their land, as foreign investors secure
the support of central government and local elites in obtaining
concessions to use what are often quite large areas by local
standards. 6
ProSAVANA has increasingly been seen as symbolizing
these trends, becoming in the process a focus for the tensions
that have accompanied them. After the initial public state-
ments by government oﬃcials from Mozambique, Brazil,
and Japan presented ProSAVANA as a program with the
potential to transform Mozambique into an exporter and
eventually an African agricultural powerhouse, 7 various cam-
paigns were launched to sell the idea of the program as an
enabling framework for international investment, particularly
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media stories about millions of hectares being made available
to Brazilian farmers in Mozambique—that alerted civil society
groups in both countries to what they were soon characteriz-
ing as a major land-grabbing threat. 8
Fears that ProSAVANA might serve as a catalyst for land-
grabbing were aggravated by the fact that the agencies respon-
sible for the program were initially quite secretive about what
exactly it was supposed to do in the Nacala Corridor. Uncer-
tainty and mistrust were generated as contradictory informa-
tion about key issues—including the role of smallholder
farmers—was relayed. 9 As Funada-Classen (2013a, p. 4) put
it for the Japanese authorities, oﬃcial communication about
the program was marked by ‘‘lack of information and a con-
stant shift in arguments, rationale, and focus”. The ﬁrst civil
society report to analyze ProSAVANA noted that a key prob-
lem was ‘‘the nonexistence of a systematic communication sys-
tem or strategy for the program” (Jamal, Ncole, Lihahe, &
Baleira 2012, p. 52). In fact, until the release of the ‘‘Zero
Draft” of the Master Plan in April 2015, the only document
on the program that had been oﬃcially disseminated was a
‘‘concept note” released 6 months after an unoﬃcial version
of the ProSAVANA Master Plan was leaked in 2013. This
concept note speciﬁcally stated that its role was not to summa-
rize the Master Plan itself but only its general approach. 10
While no oﬃcial information was being released to the peo-
ple who actually lived in the Nacala Corridor, accounts ﬁl-
tered through of promises being made to potential investors
by Mozambican oﬃcials and Brazilian consultants, and media
stories appeared that reported plans for Japanese capital
investment and visits to the Nacala Corridor by Brazilian
entrepreneurs, who had apparently been invited to occupy
large ‘‘uncultivated” portions of land. To many civil society
groups this was evidence that ProSAVANA was in fact a
land-grabbing scheme aimed at transforming diverse family
farming territories into mechanized estates producing single
crops for export. These concerns were aggravated by refer-
ences to the Brazilian Cerrado as a model experience to be
replicated in Mozambique. Within what is a complex and
highly transnationalized process of contestation—in which
the actors range from Japanese academics and corporations
to European NGOs and private equity ﬁrms to US-based
think-tanks and commodity traders—the power of landscape
imaginaries has given a particular intensity to the Brazil–
Mozambique axis. In the next section, we review how the land-
scapes of Central Brazil and the Nacala Corridor have been
represented by Brazilian and Mozambican elites, and by
transnational actors engaging with those elites to shape agri-
cultural development policies. We examine how these repre-
sentations have informed the maps developed by Brazilian
consultants to promote investment in the Nacala Corridor.
We then shift our focus to the reciprocal landscape imaginar-
ies and conceptions of agricultural development that have
been mobilized by the actors involved in contesting ProSA-
VANA, focusing on the video images of Central Brazil
recorded by Mozambican activists and used to warn the peas-
ants of the Nacala Corridor about the nature of the changes
that the program is claimed to be bringing to their region.4. IMAGINED LANDSCAPES OF AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT: THE CERRADO AND THE
SAVANNAH
Two landscapes are at the heart of the imaginaries mobilized
around ProSAVANA: the Central Brazilian Cerrado and theNorthern Mozambican savannah. A key element of the dis-
course around ProSAVANA has been the identiﬁcation of
these two landscapes as sharing a common ‘‘savannah” iden-
tity—one which outside Africa is of course bound up with a
powerful landscape imaginary, shaped by a myriad wildlife
documentaries, book covers, and safari brochures. Yet the
wooded miombo savannahs of Northern Mozambique and
the diverse, wooded grasslands, and gallery forests of the Cer-
rado (dos Santos, Barbieri, de Carvalho, & Machado, 2010;
Campbell, 1996) have very diﬀerent ecologies to the ‘‘classic”
savannah of open, grassland plains. Throughout the research,
we found Brazilian interviewees who had visited the Nacala
Corridor remarking on how they had been struck by the fact
that its landscape resembled not this ‘‘classic” imagined savan-
nah but the Brazilian Cerrado. However, ProSAVANA repre-
sented a convergence of landscape imaginaries that went
beyond this superﬁcial similarity of appearance to evoke a
broader set of historical, cultural, political, and economic res-
onances.
The historical processes shaping the ‘‘commodiﬁcation of
land, labor, and money” within the Central Brazilian Cerrado
and the northern Mozambican savannah are very diﬀerent
(Wolford & Nehring, 2015). Nevertheless, the relationships
between the regions where these landscapes are located and
each country’s centers of economic and political power have
certain revealing similarities. Elites based in remote capital
cities have long associated both regions with social and polit-
ical otherness and ungovernability, seeing them as a source of
challenges to their legitimacy. These same elites have been
encouraged in their eﬀorts to consolidate political control in
the two regions by the opportunity to exploit the natural
resources they contain. The intensity of these eﬀorts has been
shaped by the irregular cycles of commodity boom and eco-
nomic stagnation that have marked both regions since the
18th century, when both Brazil and Mozambique were under
Portuguese colonial control.
In the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, Central Brazil
entered the urban Brazilian imagination as the destination
for epic expeditions in which heroes such as Marshal Caˆndido
Rondon and the Villas-Boˆas brothers set out to demarcate
frontiers, lay telegraph lines, and make peace with the region’s
notoriously ﬁerce indigenous tribes ahead of the advancing
agricultural frontier (Hemming, 1987). The transfer of Brazil’s
capital in 1960 to the purpose-built city of Brası´lia, located in
the heart of the Cerrado belt, was an unambiguous statement
of intent in the struggle to control the ‘‘Eldorado of Central
Brazil” (Ribeiro, 2002). It was followed by the unleashing of
what Mazzetto Silva (2009, p. 62) has called a ‘‘predatory
and conservative modernization process”. This centered on
the expansion of capital-intensive, large-scale export-oriented
agriculture, made possible by the successful adaptation of soy-
bean cultivation technology—a process within which the
Japanese-supported PRODECER program is depicted as
playing a key role.
As the region’s agricultural output grew exponentially,
aided by a surge in demand for soybeans and other agricul-
tural commodities from the rising economies of Asia, Brazilian
and international economic elites alike began to speak of a
‘‘miracle of the Cerrado” (The Economist, 2010). In Brazil,
pride in this technical and commercial achievement was inter-
woven with a longstanding national narrative of commercial
farmers as rugged pioneers taming the country’s ‘‘Wild West”
(Cabral et al., 2013). This imaginary has encouraged contem-
porary Brazilian elites to look overseas for other ‘‘wild” land-
scapes that could be proﬁtably tamed using their Cerrado
experience. 11 Entrepreneurial actors operating within the
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ness—led by GV Agro, the well-connected consultancy group
that had won the contract to coordinate Brazil’s inputs to the
ProSAVANA Master Plan—directed their attention to the
savannahs of Northern Mozambique, deploying a discourse
of landscape similarity that soon took a powerful hold among
elites in both countries (Chichava et al., 2013).
As is the case for Central Brazil, the three Mozambican pro-
vinces that are the focus of ProSAVANA—Niassa, Nampula,
and Zambe´zia—have historically been places onto which agri-
cultural landscape imaginaries have been projected by colonial
and post-colonial elites. Sparsely-populated Niassa, which
during the colonial period had been run as a commodity pro-
ducing area by the Niassa Company (a royal company set up
primarily to fend oﬀ British and German plans to occupy parts
of the then Portuguese colony), became a key site of the
liberation movement Frelimo’s post-independence Operac¸a˜o
Produc¸a˜o (‘‘Operation Production”). This included the
forcible resettlement of thousands of citizens who had been
categorized as unemployed, prostitutes, or criminals in the major
cities of Maputo and Beira, who were put to work in collective
farms in remote areas (Quembo, 2012; Thomaz, 2008).
The more populous provinces of Nampula and Zambe´zia have
long seen their agricultural growth hampered not only by fac-
tors such as isolation from the urban markets of the South and
the absence of a tradition of using animal traction, but also by
political conﬂict. They were ﬁercely contested by Frelimo and
the rebel Renamo movement during Mozambique’s long civil
war (Chichava, 2007), and their strategic location astride
Development Corridors with rapidly-improving rail, road,
and river transport links to the key hotspots of Mozambique’s
mining and energy boom has made them into a political
battleground to this day. After the 2014 elections, Renamo
threatened to use force to establish ‘‘autonomous govern-
ments” in the two provinces. It was not by coincidence that
the current Frelimo president, Filipe Nyusi, launched his
2014 election campaign in Nampula by declaring his intention
to turn the province into an ‘‘agricultural powerhouse”. 12
In the last few years, key Mozambican policymakers have
become enthusiastic converts to the idea that Brazilian
agribusiness could help to make this ‘‘powerhouse” a reality,
following an extensive campaign to market various Brazilian
models of agricultural development that was spearheaded by
Brazil’s former President Luı´s Ina´cio Lula da Silva (Cabral
et al., 2016). This process has been abetted by multinational
and bilateral development agencies. During the period in
which ProSAVANA was in gestation, marked by much inter-
national excitement about the potential of an ‘‘African Green
Revolution”, the World Bank was actively promoting a land-
scape imaginary of Africa’s ‘‘Guinea Savannah”—a loosely-
deﬁned ‘‘zone” that is held to cover a third of sub-Saharan
Africa and two-thirds of Mozambique, including the Nacala
Corridor—as a ‘‘Sleeping Giant” crying out for investment
in commercial agriculture to awaken its potential (World
Bank, 2009). Most important for ProSAVANA has been the
role of JICA, which according to some observers was the orig-
inal proponent of the idea of ‘‘spreading the results of the
PRODECER to the African savannah” (Nogueira &
Ollinaho, 2013, p. 10). In her analysis of the initial Japanese
discourse on ProSAVANA, Funada-Classen (2013a, p. 9)
has highlighted how in JICA documents ‘‘tropical savannah”
functioned as ‘‘a repeated term used as the evidence of the sim-
ilarities between the Cerrado and Mozambique”.
Nevertheless, this imaginary of similarity was swiftly dis-
rupted once Japanese technicians came into direct contact with
the Nacala Corridor’s landscape (Funada-Classen, 2013a).Far from being characterized by small and scattered settle-
ments as the Brazilian Cerrado had been, the area along the
main rail line that originally deﬁned the Corridor was densely
populated by smallholders. JICA was soon publicly acknowl-
edging that, while ‘‘individual technologies of Cerrado type
savannah development can be transferred”, it was not clear
that this represented an adequate response to the key question
of ‘‘how to implement regional development” (Oriental
Consultants, 2010, p. 3).
This marks a crucial diﬀerence in relation to Brazilian dis-
courses, in which the issue of landscape similarity remained
central, consolidating itself as a key element in a vision for
the Nacala Corridor in which there was an increasingly evi-
dent commercial stake: one that centered on the possibility
of reproducing the Cerrado model in its entirety, including a
substantial element of large landholdings producing commodi-
ties for export. In the end, rather than this Brazilian landscape
imaginary being revised to ﬁt the reality of the Nacala Corri-
dor, it was the Corridor itself that was redeﬁned, as successive
maps produced by the Master Plan team expanded its area to
incorporate additional regions of Niassa Province. The incor-
porated regions were further and further away from the rail
line (the ostensible rationale for the Corridor), but had been
identiﬁed as having low population densities and agroecolog-
ical conditions that were suitable for soybean cultivation using
the large-farm Cerrado model. As a result, the region covered
by ProSAVANA grew from an initial 12 districts in 2010 to 19
districts in 2015. Thus, even while its oﬃcial narrative has
shifted strongly toward smallholder agriculture, ProSAVANA
has maintained a consistent focus on expanding the
boundaries of the Nacala Corridor into areas of Niassa
Province that have been framed by both historical Mozambican
and contemporary Brazilian elite imaginaries as empty and
available for large-scale externally-driven agricultural
development, giving credence to the suspicion that the
program continues to carry ‘‘undeclared agendas” (Mosca &
Bruna, 2015, p. 33).
(a) Representing landscape similarities as opportunity through
GIS imagery
This use of maps to expand the scope of ProSAVANA can
be situated within a long tradition of representations of land-
scape as something that can be assessed and controlled from
outside rather than experienced from within, often giving rise
to the processes of appropriation and contestation that Bryan
and Wood (2015) have called ‘‘weaponizing maps”. Within
these processes digital technologies, such as Geographical
Information Systems (GIS), can act to transform landscape
imaginaries by ‘‘privileging abstract forces and ﬂows over
the material conditions of the site” (Desimini, 2013, p. 1; see
also Rambaldi, Chambers, McCall, & Fox, 2006).
Map-making played an important symbolic as well as prac-
tical role in the colonial ‘‘scramble for Africa” (Castelo, 2012),
so it is unsurprising that there has recently been a surge in
map-making in relation to certain African landscapes as new
forms of capital expand on the continent. This surge is espe-
cially linked to the increasing interest in ‘‘African Agricultural
Growth Corridors” promoted by initiatives such as the New
Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and the Program
for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), as govern-
ments, donors, and investors seek to reorganize the territorial
governance and physical infrastructure of these regions along
export-oriented lines (Paul & Steinbrecher, 2013). The Nacala
Corridor, which connects the Brazilian-operated coalﬁelds of
Tete Province to the Brazilian-built port of Nacala, is emblem-
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resources are being mapped with extreme precision while the
territorial boundaries within which the mapping is taking
place are ﬂuid and shift constantly in response to demands
from powerful actors.
The same tensions were at the heart of Brazil’s ‘‘map wars”,
a process of political contestation in the late 1980s and early
1990s over the social, economic and environmental dynamics
unleashed by the ‘‘Greater Caraja´s” megaproject in the
forest-savannah transition zone of the Eastern Amazon (de
Almeida, 1993). Caraja´s, which centered on a rail corridor
linking the world’s largest iron ore mine with the port of
Sa˜o Luı´s, has a number of resonant similarities with the devel-
opment plans for the Nacala Corridor—starting with the role
played by the Brazilian mining and logistics giant Vale, oper-
ator of both the mine and railway in Caraja´s, as it is in Nacala.
In our interviews with Brazilian agribusiness consultants, they
described how in Caraja´s, Vale has stimulated investments in
export-oriented agriculture along the corridor, which in turn
have generated additional freight traﬃc for its rail operation,
and went on to describe how the same logic is expected to
apply in the Nacala Corridor.
One of the most powerful tools for projecting Brazilian
landscape imaginaries into other contexts has been the map-
based digital presentation package prepared by GV Agro,
the lead Brazilian consultants for the ‘‘Master Plan” compo-
nent of ProSAVANA. This deploys layers of data on soil
types, vegetation, rainfall, transport infrastructure, and land
tenure to provide visual evidence of the technical suitability
and economic viability of the sites chosen for the ‘‘agribusiness
clusters” that it proposes to set up. The package draws on a
well-established Brazilian environmental governance technol-
ogy known as Ecological-Economic Zoning (Zoneamento Eco-
lo´gico Econoˆmico, ZEE), which ﬁrst came to the fore in highly
contested megaproject-based regional development initiatives
in the Brazilian Amazon, including the Greater Caraja´s pro-
ject (Ab’Saber, 1989).
GV Agro, which is the agribusiness consulting arm of lead-
ing Brazilian business school Fundac¸a˜o Getu´lio Vargas
(FGV), is connected with Vale through a web of powerful
agribusiness interests in which its Director, former Minister
of Agriculture Roberto Rodrigues, plays a prominent role. It
has worked with the Brazilian mining giant in the Caraja´s
region, as well as in several African countries, including
Mozambique. During an interview in Sa˜o Paulo in October
2012, one GV Agro consultant eagerly pulled out his laptop
to show how ZEE methodology had helped the ﬁrm to design
an oil-palm project in the Caraja´s region that was being taken
as the model for the clusters ProSAVANA intended to intro-
duce in the Nacala Corridor. He emphasized that the project’s
successful incorporation of local small-scale producers via a
contract farming scheme could be replicated in Mozambique.
In his view, the fact that these ‘‘small farmers” had an average
landholding of around 100 ha, more than 60 times larger than
the average for family farmers in the Nacala Corridor, did not
undermine the model’s replicability.
During the same interview, the GV Agro consultant shared
a PowerPoint slide with an image that has become one of the
most widely-circulated representations of agroecological simi-
larity between the Brazilian Cerrado and the Mozambican
savannah: a map showing how the two regions lie within the
same parallels of latitude, accompanied by bullet-points high-
lighting that the regions share ‘‘similar biomass” and ‘‘similar
challenges” (cf. Wolford & Nehring, 2015) (see Fig. 1).
Variations on this image have continued to circulate in
Brazil and beyond, as GV Agro’s sister ﬁrm GV Projetoshas run ‘‘roadshows” designed to attract international
investment to the private-sector ‘‘Nacala Fund” that it has
now set up using the data collected and the contacts estab-
lished through GV Agro’s involvement in the ProSAVANA
Master Plan process. As contestation has grown within
Mozambique and Brazil, this image (and its attendant display
of ZEE technology, which is designed to reassure audiences of
GV Agro’s profound knowledge of the landscape of northern
Mozambique) has been used to promote ﬁrst ProSAVANA
and now the Nacala Fund in centers of global capital located
far from the Nacala Corridor.
During the initial phase of the ‘‘Master Plan” development
process GV Agro’s team was criticized by some of our inter-
viewees for making only brief ‘‘ﬂying visits” to the Nacala
Corridor. However, the consultant we interviewed in Sa˜o
Paulo in October 2012 stated that the GV Agro team had
already collected most of the data they needed to produce their
ZEE models and identify potential cluster sites for the Nacala
Corridor well before the ‘‘Master Plan” ﬁeld trips oﬃcially
began, as part of previous work for ‘‘another client”—which
other sources later conﬁrmed was Vale (cf. Rossi, 2015). GV
Agro, Vale, and the networks of Brazilian and global capital
with which they are connected have been mapping the Nacala
Corridor since long before the Japanese, Mozambican, and
Brazilian governments came together to launch ProSAVANA.5. THE TRANSNATIONAL CONTESTATION OF
PROSAVANA
While proponents of ProSAVANA have used maps to rep-
resent agroecological similarities between Brazil and Mozam-
bique and the commercial potential of the Nacala Corridor,
civil society organizations critical of the program have used
audiovisual materials as key artifacts in the contestation of
ProSAVANA. Of particular importance has been ‘‘Face
Oculta do ProSAVANA” (‘‘The Hidden Face of
ProSAVANA”) (Ram Multimedia, 2013). 13 This is a video
documentary based on images and interviews collected by
members of UNAC (Mozambique’s National Union of Peas-
ants) and ORAM (a Mozambican rural support NGO) who
received support from the Brazilian NGO FASE (the Federa-
tion of Social and Educational Support Organizations) and a
number of international NGOs and foundations to visit the
agribusiness-dominated Brazilian state of Mato Grosso in
2012, with the aim of hearing from Brazilian grassroots actors
what their experiences had been with PRODECER.
FASE also organized trips by Brazilian activists to the
Nacala Corridor, generating eyewitness accounts of the land-
scape threatened by the program, complete with nostalgic ref-
erences to the once-diverse Cerrado landscape destroyed by
soybean cultivation, together with comparisons between the
understandings of territory of Nampula’s ‘‘native communi-
ties” and the communal notions of Brazil’s indigenous peoples
(Ferreira, 2013; Mello, 2013).
(b) Representing landscape similarities as threat through a video
documentary
These imaginaries were mirrored by the Mozambican acti-
vists who visited Mato Grosso to produce the video documen-
tary, which uses stock footage of indigenous hunters moving
through a forest and naked indigenous children splashing hap-
pily in a river to evoke the lost landscape of traditional com-
munities living in harmony with Nature. The video
repeatedly contrasts these images with others representing
Figure 1. Brazilian consultants’ presentation of similarities between the Brazilian Cerrado and the Mozambican savannah. Source: GV Agro presentation for
marketing event in Accra, Ghana, 2012.
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‘‘Brazilian Model” of agrarian development, principally
through long takes showing vast expanses of sugarcane or soy-
bean monoculture in Mato Grosso, still photographs of
gleaming farm machinery and interviews in which Mato
Grosso residents describe pesticides being sprayed indiscrimi-
nately from planes, poisoning the land and the people of what
was once the Cerrado. This material, in turn, is intercut with
images of the rich and diverse miombo woodlands of the
Nacala Corridor and of Mozambican women harvesting cas-
sava by hand, without a tractor in sight.
This linking of territory and tradition suggests that both
Brazilian and Mozambican activists have ignored Sauer’s
(2012, pp. 93–4) warning that it is dangerous when ‘‘the ﬁght
for territory becomes restricted to ‘‘traditional communities”,
as a ﬁght for backwardness”, and his suggestion that such
struggles should ‘‘reject the notion of a traditional community
as a socio-cultural group in opposition to notions of progress
and development”. As Sauer points out, struggles for the right
to territory become vulnerable to accusations that they are
conservative reactions when they adopt this traditionalist
framing, rather than focusing on the multiplicity of actually
existing modernities and the right of a given territory’s inhab-
itants to determine their own terms of engagement with
‘‘modernity at large” (cf. Appadurai, 1996). However, the
deployment of a landscape imaginary associating the Cerrado
and the savannah with time-honored traditions of life and
livelihood is clearly a powerful resource for contesting land-
grabs, since it conveys a notion of primordial belonging at
the same time as evoking sustainability and the protection ofbiodiversity, which are important for building the kind of alli-
ances with environmental groups that have helped Brazilian
indigenous peoples to retain control of many of their territo-
ries (cf. Schwartzman & Zimmerman, 2005).
(b) Contesting ProSAVANA in Brazil
Following the exchange visits that gave rise to UNAC and
ORAM’s documentary, FASE and its allies were able to
extend the mobilization process in Brazil through networks
that connected civil society organizations and academics inter-
ested in Brazil’s growing international role with parts of the
country’s ruling Workers’ Party and with key sites for formal
government-civil society dialog, such as the National Food
and Nutrition Security Council (CONSEA). These networks
play a key role in mobilizing one of the three discourse coali-
tions, labeled by Cabral (2015) as ‘‘priests”, ‘‘technicians”, and
‘‘traders”, that dominate domestic struggles over Brazilian
South–South Cooperation with their competing emphases on
solidarity, technology, and commercial interest.
FASE’s solidarity-oriented network, which includes other
leading Brazilian NGOs such as IBASE and INESC, intersects
with but is distinct from another part of the ‘‘priests” dis-
course coalition: the agrarian networks that link Brazilian
organizations such as the Movement of Landless Rural Work-
ers (MST) and its sister organization the Movement of Small
Farmers (MPA) with UNAC through the transnational agrar-
ian movement (TAM) Vı´a Campesina, described by Borras
et al. (2008, p. 172) as ‘‘perhaps the most politically coherent
of all contemporary TAMs”. The MST and MPA have a long-
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agroecology knowledge exchange project. Like the larger
Workers’ Party-aligned rural union Contag, they also have
strong links with Brazil’s Ministry of Agrarian Development,
which increasingly competes with the Ministry of Agriculture
for leadership in Brazilian agricultural development coopera-
tion (Cabral, 2015).
The MPA and Contag both have seats on CONSEA, which
is currently chaired by a FASE representative. 14 It was a com-
bination of these NGO and movement networks that in
December 2013 secured an invitation for a UNAC spokesper-
son to present the organization’s views on Brazil–Mozam-
bique agricultural development cooperation at a CONSEA
meeting. This contributed to a resolution that included
strongly-worded criticism of ProSAVANA (CONSEA, 2013,
p. 6). Given CONSEA’s formal status and political prestige,
this made it impossible for the Brazilian government to ignore
the controversy. It signaled the end of oﬃcial statements about
ProSAVANA that echoed the triumphalist rhetoric of
agribusiness boosters such as GV Agro, whose formal role
in the program began to be wound down as the search began
for a more smallholder-friendly framing for the program.
(c) Contesting ProSAVANA in Mozambique
In Mozambique, the documentary ﬁlm Face Oculta had
meanwhile become a key artifact in the contestation of ProSA-
VANA, being repeatedly screened as part of UNAC-organized
platforms at the local and national levels. The video was shown
and discussed at UNAC’s three regional meetings in 2013; dur-
ing our ﬁeldwork we witnessed how hundreds-strong audiences
watched with rapt attention while the video relayed the stories
of Brazilian small farmers and indigenous activists who had
lost land or been squeezed out of markets, supplemented with
expert testimony from activist researchers. After the screening
of the video, which ends with Brazilian farmers advising their
Mozambican counterparts not to accept a program similar to
PRODECER—at least not without conducting proper
research to learn about what it entails—a member of UNAC’s
technical team (the group of young activist-advisors who lead
its communication and advocacy work) would ask the assem-
bled farmers ‘‘e´ isto que no´s queremos?” (‘‘is this what we
want?”), to which the audience would respond in unison
‘‘Na˜oooo!” (‘‘No!”). These set-piece events were followed by
meetings with representatives of farmers’ associations where
the video was discussed and awareness-raising strategies were
drawn up to be implemented at district level. 15
In the 2 years during which the release of the Master Plan
was repeatedly delayed, the landscape imaginary articulated
in the video came to dominate local and national perceptions
of what the program would deliver. Face Oculta was used to
expose contradictions in public statements made by oﬃcials,
as UNAC and other civil society organizations pursued a sys-
tematic strategy of inviting government and ProSAVANA
representatives to national meetings at which the video was
being presented. In a context marked by longstanding,
historically-rooted mistrust of government in many parts of
rural Mozambique (including much of the Nacala Corridor),
the perception that oﬃcials were not telling the truth about
the program was quickly able to take root, reinforcing the
video’s message that the ‘‘hidden face” of ProSAVANA was
its real face.
Several of these meetings brought together Mozambican
civil society organizations and peasant leaders with Brazilian
and Japanese civil society organizations and pro-peasant
international social movement organizations. They helped toconsolidate an international alliance that not only included
the MPA, UNAC’s fellow Vı´a Campesina member organiza-
tion, but also a signiﬁcant contingent of environmental NGOs
led by Justic¸a Ambiental (JA, Environmental Justice), the
Mozambique branch of Friends of the Earth International.
Despite their diﬀerent class and ideological origins, the agrar-
ian and green movement organizations found common ground
in opposing the environmental and social impact of high-input
monoculture (associated with biodiversity loss by JA and with
the power of transnational seed companies by the MPA) and
promoting agroecology as an alternative.
This civil society alliance produced and disseminated a series
of open letters to the Mozambican, Brazilian, and Japanese
governments demanding information and public consultation
on ProSAVANA. When by mid-2014 the governments still
had not released the Master Plan, UNAC and a number of
Mozambican civil society organizations decided to launch a
‘‘No to ProSAVANA Campaign” to stop the program alto-
gether (Beghin, 2014, p. 53). The response ﬁnally came in April
2015 when the newly-elected Mozambican government
released the ‘‘Zero Draft” Master Plan and organized a new
round of consultations throughout the districts of the Nacala
Corridor.
(d) From contestation to transformation?
The productive eﬀect of the contestation process can be seen
in the diﬀerences between this new ‘‘Zero Draft” and the ver-
sion of the Master Plan that was leaked in 2013. In contrast
with the initial framing of the program that emphasized its
strong export-oriented commodities component, the version
of ProSAVANA presented for public discussion in April
2015 had a new emphasis on smallholder agriculture, subsis-
tence and local markets, leading one observer to conclude that
it was ‘‘clearly written by Brazilians from the pro-peasant fac-
tion of ProSAVANA” (Hanlon, 2015, p. 2). In fact, since the
‘‘pro-peasant” faction of Brazilian agricultural cooperation
policy (represented by the Ministry of Agrarian Development)
had refused to get involved with the Master Plan, the revised
version was mostly written by Brazilian consultants under
contract to JICA, which had become very concerned to pre-
sent itself as ‘‘pro-peasant” in the face of rising criticism of
its role in ProSAVANA by Japanese civil society. JICA
ensured that these Brazilian consultants were not the same
GV Agro team who had produced the controversial version
of the Master Plan leaked in 2013 (Mosca & Bruna, 2015, p.
12).
However, the contestation did not have a similarly produc-
tive eﬀect on the broader dynamics of Brazilian and Japanese
investment in the Nacala Corridor. The Nacala Fund, initially
a much-vaunted strategy for leveraging private-sector invest-
ment to support ProSAVANA’s commercial agriculture com-
ponent, is nowhere to be found in the ‘‘Zero Draft” Master
Plan. But although GV Agro has been sidelined from the oﬃ-
cial ProSAVANA program, its sister ﬁrm GV Projetos has
begun to promote a rebranded and repositioned Nacala
Fund—this time negotiated directly with the Government of
Mozambique, by-passing the Brazilian and Japanese oﬃcial
development cooperation agencies (Amorim, 2014, p. 12).
Meanwhile, Japanese corporations are continuing to invest
alongside Brazil’s Vale in the infrastructure that will make
the Nacala Corridor an attractive export platform (Mitsui,
2014). The Japanese and Mozambican governments have
now launched an ambitious new Project for Economic Devel-
opment Strategies in the Nacala Corridor (PEDEC) that aims
to promote ‘‘integrated development strategies” across ﬁve
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(Oriental Consultants, International Development Center of
Japan, & Eight-Japan Engineering Consultants Inc., 2014,
pp. 1–1).
None of this is any longer oﬃcially classiﬁed as part of
ProSAVANA. 16 According to Mosca and Bruna (2015,
p. 30), the new conﬁguration of the program suggests that Pro-
SAVANA may represent ‘‘only the family farming compo-
nent” of the overall strategy for the Nacala Corridor. This
has made it possible to deny that land conﬂicts—such as the
one involving a large soybean farm in Zambe´zia that is part-
owned by the Brazilian agribusiness ﬁrm Grupo Pinesso
(UNAC & GRAIN, 2015, p. 9)—are linked to the program.
The role of transnational capital in the Corridor has thus been
rendered less visible—and less subject to demands for public
accountability—by being edited out of the oﬃcial version of
what ProSAVANA represents.
The transformation in the program document has thus not
been translated into changes in the logic of broader govern-
ment and corporate plans for the Nacala Corridor. Nor has
it meant more eﬀective inclusion of civil society organizations,
despite the assurances of commitment to ‘‘broad, participatory
and inclusive discussion on the path to be followed for devel-
oping agriculture in the Nacala Corridor in particular and in
Mozambique in general”. 17 The optimism that greeted Presi-
dent Nyusi’s rhetoric when the Zero Draft consultation pro-
cess was launched soon gave way to skepticism after the
process was denounced as deeply ﬂawed, authoritarian, and
‘‘lacking in democratic spirit” (Mosca & Bruna, 2015, p. 25).
It remains to be seen whether the release of the ‘‘Zero Draft”
represents a genuine departure from the entrenched govern-
ment practice of provisionality in policy making, in which
plans and ideas are preferably communicated orally and poli-
cies are continuously revised as implementation takes place
(Gonc¸alves, 2013).
There has, however, been a transformation in two areas: the
conﬁguration of coalitions linking local and national Mozam-
bican peasant organizations with other civil society groups in
Mozambique, Brazil, and beyond; and the space for civil soci-
ety engagement in South–South development cooperation pol-
icy. The contestation of ProSAVANA has provided an
opportunity for the revitalization of UNAC, which has
regained public visibility. ProSAVANA has also allowed
UNAC to build alliances with environmental groups by pro-
moting agroecology as a sustainable alternative to the input-
intensive monocultures of the Cerrado, following the example
of the MST (Borsatto & do Carmo, 2013, p. 656). More
importantly, at the local level, ProSAVANA has provided
UNAC with an opportunity to expand its membership base
in rural areas, especially in the Nacala Corridor. Thanks to
the eﬀectiveness of resistance to land-grabbing as a unifying
appeal, national-level activists were able to build new links
with the local peasant associations that they had long strug-
gled to mobilize, leading one activist to reﬂect that ‘‘perhaps
ProSAVANA will be a ‘‘necessary evil”—necessary in order
to provoke negatively aﬀected communities to rise up”
(Monjane, 2015, p. 1).
UNAC has not been the only civil society organization to
beneﬁt from the contestation process: in Brazil, FASE, and
other solidarity-based NGOs have been able to leverage sig-
niﬁcant new material and symbolic resources, strengthening
their positions at a time when conventional Northern donor
funding for the civil society groups now engaging with
South–South cooperation is under threat from multiple
directions (Poskitt, Shankland, & Taela, 2016). The contes-
tation around ProSAVANA has thus transformed the spacefor civil society engagement with South–South cooperation.
Internationally, it not only activated existing transnational
networks such as those linking UNAC and the MST and
Justic¸a Ambiental and Friends of the Earth, but also estab-
lished new ones such as those linking Mozambican and
Japanese CSOs. In Brazil, the program provided the focus
for mobilization that civil society organizations needed, after
a period as largely impotent by-standers while Brazilian
government and corporate actors moved rapidly into Africa
during Lula’s presidency. Thanks to the willingness of high-
visibility state-society engagement spaces like CONSEA to
discuss ProSAVANA, and thereby to take on the conse-
quences of Brazil’s South–South cooperation activities for
poor and marginalized people overseas as a legitimate topic
for debate, the government was prodded out of its reluc-
tance to engage with these issues, eﬀectively ‘‘putting an
end to the insulation of cooperation from wider state-
society dynamics” (Cabral & Leite, 2015, p. 440). Thanks
to organizations like FASE that have the ability to bridge
domestic and international policy domains and to use
party-based and other networks to draw inﬂuential govern-
ment ﬁgures into the discussion, this debate may evolve into
a more inclusive policy discussion on Brazil’s development
cooperation activities.6. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CONTESTATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF
PROSAVANA
Since work on the Master Plan began in 2012, the tri-
umphantly optimistic tone of the original promotion of Pro-
SAVANA has evaporated, and both Brazilian and Japanese
development agencies have grown wary of even discussing
the program as the political cost of promoting it rises. In part,
this is due to the waning of investor enthusiasm as a result of
falling commodity prices. Management problems have also
played a role: the ‘‘Extension and Models” component
through which ProSAVANA was supposed to engage with
smallholders has yet to take oﬀ, and the research and technol-
ogy transfer component has been criticized. 18 However, the
strength and visibility of transnational civil society contesta-
tion has been a major factor in driving the transformation
of the program (Mosca & Bruna, 2015).
Both landscape-inspired assumptions about similarity and
transferability and landscape-focused contestations have
played a role in shaping ProSAVANA. Key to this was the
mobilization of landscape imaginaries through the use of gra-
phic and audio-visual artifacts. ProSAVANA’s initial incarna-
tion—powerfully captured in the GIS imagery used by GV
Agro’s consultants—managed to unite fears of land-grabbing,
biodiversity loss, transnational corporate encroachment, Japa-
nese government resource-seeking, Brazilian government ‘‘sub-
imperialism”, and Mozambican government authoritarianism.
Those contesting ProSAVANA deployed alternative landscape
imaginaries, using easily-distributed audio-visual materials
such as the Face Oculta documentary to communicate across
sites and scales in a way that no report or speech could have
done. Technology can thus expand the mobilizing potential of
images and imaginaries, placing representational tools such as
digital videos and websites within reach of farmer groups in
Mozambique who can turn the gaze back on the more powerful
Brazilian ‘‘Other” and problematize the claims of similarity on
which the discourse of South–South cooperation is founded.
The contestation process contains lessons both for transna-
tional agrarian movements and for advocates of South–South
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example of the power of landscape imaginaries to mobilize
across scales when deployed in accessible formats. However,
this also carries risks. The ﬁrst is that eco-traditionalist land-
scape imaginaries such as those articulated in the Face Oculta
documentary can help to build alliances between green groups
and agrarian movements, while simultaneously opening up
opportunities for governments and corporations to outﬂank
them by promising material ‘‘development” beneﬁts to their
grassroots constituencies, as the ‘‘Zero Draft” Master Plan
does. The second is that eﬀective contestation may drive gov-
ernments to remove explicit references to the role of transna-
tional capital from their programs, thereby making this role
less rather than more subject to public scrutiny and demands
for accountability. This can leave mobilization focused on
opposing a government program such as ProSAVANA even
after it has ceased to represent a serious threat, while the plans of
the corporations themselves remain unchanged and unchallenged.In bothMozambique and Brazil, a less simplistic set of narra-
tives about the potential for transforming African agriculture
should now inform debates on South–South cooperation fol-
lowing the ProSAVANA experiences. This will require a more
nuanced approach to arguments about agroclimatic similarity,
and a challenge to the framing of South–South cooperation as a
vehicle for harmonious transfer of ‘‘best ﬁt” development expe-
riences. Instead a greater focus on adaptive learning will be
required. South–South cooperation initiatives are no diﬀerent
frommost other development programs; they undergo constant
revision as diﬀerent actors incorporate new ideas and draw les-
sons from unexpected results, while also struggling for position
within inevitably contested processes. An approach that
responds to dissent and opposition rather than seeking to deny
or disguise it, and embeds learning in its approach, is likely to
oﬀer a much more robust and valuable pathway toward fulﬁll-
ing the potential of South–South cooperation as a source of
support for African agriculture.NOTES1. These were Nampula in Nampula Province, Lichinga, Cuamba,
Majune, and Mandimba in Niassa Province and Lioma in Zambe´zia
Province.
2. See ‘‘Disclosure of the Master Plan Zero Draft” on ProSAVANA’s
web page: http://prosavana.gov.mz/index.php?p=biblioteca&id=27 (ac-
cessed 20/05/15).




5. See MINAG (2008). Toward the end of his second and ﬁnal term,
president Guebuza was honored as a ”hero of the green revolution”
despite the limited success achieved. See ‘‘Guebuza e a agricultura:
homenagem na hora do adeus” in Notı´cias http://www.jornalnoticias.co.
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